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WILLIAM A. REPPY, JR.*
Although this symposium issue is devoted to community property topics,
attorneys, judges, and scholars from equitable distribution states will find a
wealth of pertinent material in the articles because equitable distribution is so
firmly rooted in community property theory.' All2 of the forty-two noncommu-
nity property jurisdictions in the United States now have in place a process for
equitable distribution of property at divorce that borrows to some degree from
the partnership theory of community property. As I have noted elsewhere,
however, equitable distribution jurisdictions must consider certain points of
difference in assessing the applicability of community property precedents. For
example, the fact that community property regimes must deal with the problems
of management and creditors' rights that arise out of recognition of co-ownership
during, and not just at the end of, the marriage has caused community property
jurisdictions to be cautious in considering assets appropriate for community
classification when such caution is not required in equitable distribution states.
3
Two articles in the symposium focus on the history of Texas community
property law to highlight another point that equitable distribution states must
consider in assessing community property precedents: peculiar local institutions
that have warped the development of marital property theory. Such local-law
impediments have existed in Texas more than in any other community property
state. Professor Joseph McKnight4 traces how a senselessly rigid interpretation
of a provision in the Texas constitution referring to a married woman's separate
property has been a strait-jacket hampering development of community property
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1. See HOMER H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIc RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 591-92
(2d ed., 1988); JOHN DEWrIr GREGORY, THE LAW OF EourrABLE DISTRIBUTION 1 1.02 (1989).
2. I have seen some writers list Mississippi as one state not employing equitable distribution at
divorce. A recent article discloses, however, that under the rubric of lump sum alimony and/or implied
economic partnership between husband and wife, Mississippi divorce courts effectively apply equitable
distribution principles. Thomas W. Crockett & J. Randall Patterson, Dividing the Property in a Marital
Dissolution, 62 Miss. L.J. 57 (1992).
3. William A. Reppy, Jr., Major Events in the Evolution of American Community Property Law
and Their Import to Equitable Distribution States, 23 FAM. L. Q. 163 (1989).
4. Joseph W. McKnight, Texas Community Property Law: Conservative Attitudes, Reluctant
Change, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 71 (Spring 1993).
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law. Professor James Paulsen5 traces the history of Texas's no alimony rule-a
bar unique to Texas among the fifty-one American jurisdictions. His article
discloses the bar to be less of a factor in directing the marital property regime
of Texas in unusual directions than the state constitutional provision has been,
but still a factor that equitable distribution states should assess when considering
application of Texas precedent to an issue arising in the equitable distribution
context.
The articles by Professor Thomas Andrews 6 on treatment of rents and profits
from separate property and by Professor Grace Ganz Blumberg7 on valuing
professional goodwill as community property deal with basic principles of
classification. The issue of classifying as "separate" or "community" in
community property states is directly analogous to the issue of treatment as
marital or nonmarital property (or divisible versus nondivisible property) in the
common law states. It is in the broad area of classification that one would
expect the common law states to cite most frequently to community property
precedents. As a small test of this intuitive conclusion, I conducted a Westlaw
search of citations in the common law jurisdictions of forty significant community
property cases.
Just over half of the forty cases dealt primarily with classification issues, the
rest with management powers, liability for mismanagement, methods of
uncommingling, rights of reimbursement, and so on. As I expected, the most
frequently cited by common law courts of the forty community property cases
dealt with classification. By far the most cited case was Nail v. Nail,' which held
that the professional goodwill of an unincorporated sole practitioner spouse was
incapable of being community property. Nail is cited twenty-four times in
eighteen common law states.9
The third most cited of my forty cases1" also dealt with an issue of classifica-
tion--classification of tort recoveries, a problem often not directly addressed by
equitable distribution statutes and thus left to the courts to resolve based on
general theories for distinguishing marital and nonmarital estates.11 Of the
second and the fourth through seventh most cited cases in my survey, two dealt
5. James W. Paulsen, Remember The Alamo[ny]! The Unique Texas Ban on Permanent Alimony
and the Development of Community Property Law, 56 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7 (Spring 1993).
6. Thomas R. Andrews, Income from Separate Property: Towards a Theoretical Foundation, 56
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 171 (Spring 1993).
7. Grace Ganz Blumberg, Identifying and Valuing Goodwill at Divorce, 56 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 217 (Spring 1993).
8. 486 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. 1972).
9. As Professor Blumberg's article demonstrates, Nail is an erroneous holding. I found it cited in
the common law states in seminal decisions on the issue of goodwill as marital property as a leading case
for a minority rule pressed upon the divorce court by the professional spouse only to be rejected as
unsound. Of the 24 cases citing Nail, all but four declined to follow it.
10. Marriage of Brown, 100 Wash. 2d 729, 675 P.2d 1207 (1984) (eight cites in seven common law
states).
11. See Willard H. DaSilva, Property Subject to Equitable Distribution, in 1 VALUATION AND
DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL PROPERTY 18-1, § 118.05[5] (John P. McCahey ed., 1984).
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with classification directly12 and three dealt with classification as affected by
problems of commingling and uncommingling.13
I also had anticipated that community property precedents dealing with
apportionment of gains resulting from community labor applied to separate
capital would have been often cited, 14 but they were not. Most of the prece-
dents in this area are from states where rents and profits accruing during
marriage from separate capital are similarly separate property. California's
leading case in this area 5 has acquired but a single cite (from Missouri) from
common law states. The most-cited case in this area-three citations-is Cockrill
v. Cockrill from Arizona.
16
In four community property states, rents and profits from separate capital
are, ordinarily, community rather than separate property.1 7 Their courts have
produced few precedents on the problem of distinguishing increase from inflation
and other natural causes from profits (and increase due to community labor).
Of four significant community property cases dealing with this issue, only one is
cited in common law states." This is partly explained by the fact that among
common law states the analogous rule that rents and profits from nonmarital
property are marital is a distinct minority position.1 9
Equitable distribution states also must grapple with the appropriate remedy
for situations where one estate has contributed to the increase in value of the
other but under the fixtures doctrine has acquired no share of ownership, for
example, where nonmarital funds are used to build a structure on land that is
12. Marriage of Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1979), overruled in Marriage of
Lucas, 27 Cal.3d 806, 166 Cal. Rptr. 853,614 P.2d 285 (1980) (classifying residence acquired by payments
over time) (11 cites in nine states); Sims v. Sims, 358 So. 2d 919 (La. 1978) (apportioning pension earned
partly before, partly during marriage into separate and community shares) (seven cites in five states);
Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d 841, 166 Cal. Rptr. 853, 614 P.2d 285 (1980) (effect of title on classifica-
tion) (five cites in four states).
13. Marriage of Moore, 28 Cal. 3d 366, 168 Cal. Rptr. 662, 618 P.2d 209 (1980) (effect of using
community funds to make purchase money mortgage payment after separate funds used for down
payment) (five cites in four states); See v. See, 64 Cal. 2d 778, 51 Cal. Rptr. 888, 415 P.2d 776 (1966) (use
of the family-expense doctrine to uncommingle account containing community and separate funds).
14. I had also expected the equitable distribution states' courts to be citing to three classic
community property cases long used as teachers' tools to illustrate that (a) property acquired by bequest
or devise may be community if the will was written pursuant to contract, Andrews v. Andrews, 116
Wash. 513, 199 P. 981 (1921); (b) gains from a contract made during marriage are separate property if
the contracting spouse used his status as heir to negotiate the deal, Estate of Clark, 94 Cal. App. 453,
271 P. 542 (1928); and (c) a gift to both spouses can be community property rather than tenancy in
common property, Estate of Salvini, 65 Wash. 2d 442, 397 P.2d 811 (1964). Yet none of the three cases
is cited in a common law jurisdiction for a holding relating to community property law.
15. Beam v. Bank of America, 6 Cal. 12, 490 P.2d 2157, 98 Cal. Rptr. 137 (1972).
16. 124 Ariz. 50, 601 P.2d 1334 (1979).
17. See Andrews, supra note 6, at 171 n.3 (Idaho, Louisiana, Texas, and Wisconsin).
18. Speer v. Quinlan, 96 Idaho 119, 525 P.2d 314 (1973) (three cites).
19. Five common law states follow this minority approach. Emily Osborn, Comment, The Treatment
of Unearned Separate Property at Divorce in Common Law Property Jurisdictions, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 903,
915-16 (1990). Arkansas is listed in the Comment as one, but its statute excludes rents and profits from
nonmarital property from the marital estate. ARK. CODE. ANN. § 9-12-315(b)(7). At least two of the
four other states cited have recognized the problem of apportioning marital profits from nonmarital gain
due to inflation and other natural conditions: Smith v. Smith, 497 S.W.2d 418 (Ky. 1973); Meservy v.
Meservy, 841 S.W.2d 240 (Mo. App. 1992).
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marital property. Most community property cases resolve these problems under
the law of reimbursement, which equitable distribution states can apply by
analogy. Hence the article in this symposium, written by Professor Cynthia
Samuel,2 on difficulties Louisiana has had with reimbursement cases, is not just
of interest to readers from Louisiana. My search revealed, however, that five
significant reimbursement decisions from Arizona, California, Texas, and
Washington, including Anderson v. Gilliland,21 had generated only one citation
from common law states, a Missouri cite to Marriage of Elam.22
In large measure, the laws of community property states concerning
management of community assets by husband and wife are not applicable by
analogy in common law jurisdictions even in instances of a couple there co-
owning property in tenancy in common, joint tenancy, or tenancy by the entirety.
That is because the basic rule in community property states is that each spouse
has management over the entire asset (if personalty), whereas with tenancy in
common and joint tenancy, a spouse manages only his or her half interest.
However, the modern common law rule that joint action of both spouses is
necessary to convey or encumber tenancy by the entireties property is similar to
the rule in seven community property states applied to community realty. A
computer search for citations to four useful community property cases dealing
with avoidance of joinder by one spouse under theories of estoppel or ratification
revealed none in common law jurisdictions.
An equally obvious analogy equitable distribution states might draw involves
the case where, after separation, a spouse who is sole owner of marital (divisible)
property by mismanagement causes it to be devalued, squanders it, or suffers its
unexplained disappearance. Even though community property is co-owned,
when it was (before gender-neutralizing reform) subject to management solely
by the husband, similar problems arose in community property states. Two on-
point California cases in this mold had not been cited, I learned, in equitable
distribution states. Texas retains single-spouse management of his or her
uncommingled earnings,' and a Texas case decided under this approach to
management involving community property disappearing on the eve of divorce
acquired one citation in a common law state.24 Other examples could be laid
out to illustrate how attorneys in and scholars of equitable distribution systems
will find much of value in Professor Thomas Oldham's' detailed survey of
20. Cynthia Samuel, Restoration of the Separate Estate from Community Property After the Equal
Management Reform: Some Thoughts on Louisiana's Reimbursement Rules, 56 Law & Contemp. Probs.
273 (Spring 1993).
21. 684 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. 1985) (reimbursement available for greater of value added or amount
spent, overruling Spanish-based cases choosing the lesser of these figures).
22. 97 Wash. 2d 811, 650 P.2d 213 (1982) (improving estate shares in inflationary gain enjoyed by
entire property based on amount spent to improve).
23. TEX. FAM. CODE § 5.22(a).
24. Reaney v. Reaney, 505 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. Civ. App., Dallas, 1974, no writ)(concerning what kind
of squandering of community property by a manager spouse imposes liability) (cited in New Jersey).
25. J. Thomas Oldham, Management of the Community Estate During an Intact Marriage, 56 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 99 (Spring 1993).
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management and control26 statutes and implementing cases in the nine
community property states.
When a marriage ends by death of a spouse, the common legal issues shared
by community property and common law states are fewer than at divorce, but
there are several. Professor Carol Bruch's' article in this symposium explores
one of them: whether a testator spouse can avoid forced heirship laws-those
that provide a surviving spouse a nonbarrable share of property owned by the
decedent--of his domicile by a provision in his will purporting to make the law
of another jurisdiction controlling. Since all common law states but only five'
of the nine community property states provide forced heirship rights to surviving
spouses, Professor Bruch's article is the one in the symposium most clearly of
concern to readers not practicing in or studying the laws of a community
property jurisdiction.
26. This phrase is not redundant, as control refers to one spouse's veto power over the management
decision of the other.
27. Carol S. Bruch, The Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Succession to the Estates of
Deceased Persons: Do Quasi-Community Property and Mandatory Survivorship Laws Need Protection?,
56 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 309 (Spring 1993).
28. California (where the divorce law term quasi-community property has become associated with
the doctrine), Idaho (via its adaptation of the Uniform Probate Code), Louisiana, Washington, and
Wisconsin (where the theory is a deferred community regime). The new Louisiana statute applies quasi-
community property theory-a forced heir's claim equivalent to a nonacquiring spouse's ownership rights
in movables onerously acquired while the couple were domiciled in a common law state-to a half
interest in the decedent's property. Under quasi-community property theory, the surviving spouse would
have no forced heir's rights (other than a marital portion claim) in the other half, which would be treated
as if it always had been Louisiana separate property. But Louisiana Civil Code article 3526 allows the
surviving spouse to additionally claim in that half a forced heir's share under the laws of the former
domicile of the spouse at the time of acquisition. The marital portion is available only if the decedent
dies rich in comparison to the wealth of the surviving spouse. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2432.

